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A B S T R A C T  A R T I C L E   I N F O 
With this paper we show how the natural “science of control and 
communications in the animal and the machine” identified by Wiener in 
1948 can be applied to social organizations to establish a science of 
governance. Evidence is provided that current practices are not 
consistent with the laws of nature or the practices of living things that 
must become self-regulating and self-governing to exist in dynamic 
unknowable complex environments. Case studies of stakeholder mutual 
firms with hundreds of boards show how an ecological form of 
polycentric decision-making provides: (a) division of powers; (b) checks 
and balances; (c) distributed intelligence to reduce information overload, 
and (d) decomposition of decision-making labour to introduce tensions 
of challenge; (e) a requisite variety of cross checking communication 
and control channels from stakeholder engagement to improve their 
integrity; (f) integration of management and governance to further self-
regulation and self-governance with: (g) operating advantages such as 
resiliency, sustainability and wellbeing for firm, its stakeholders and 
society. The case studies illustrate how ecological governance could 
reduce the size, scope, cost and intrusiveness of government and their 
regulators while improving economic efficiency and enriching 
democracy with widespread citizen stakeholder engagement. 
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This paper shows how the natural "science of control and communications in the animal and 
the machine" identified and described by Wiener (1948) as “cybernetics” can be applied to social 
organizations to establish a science of governance. The science of governance explains how small-
brained creatures with little intelligence can sustain their existence in complex, unknowable dynamic 
environments while corporations governed by large brained highly intelligent humans cannot. 
 
Adoption of the science of governance provides a basis for achieving a sustainable future for 
corporate governance theory and practice.  However, it means discarding some so called “best 
governance” practices and turning others upside down.  This is because all creatures including 
humans sustain their existence from augmenting internal top down control and communication 
channels with bottom up and other channels to create an “ecological” form of “network governance” 
(Turnbull 2002a). 
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Network governance arises when a network of boards, and/or control centers internal and/or 
external to an organization governs its operations.  This definition extends the one proposed by 
Jones, Hesterly & Borgatti (1997) who did not consider the possibility of a division of power occuring 
within an organisation to create an internal network of control centers to introduce distributed 
intelligence.  Their defintion was limited to networks of firms.  This created the problem of 
identifying the boundaries of firms as raised by Zingales (2000). 
 
Highly successful examples of network governed organisations with over a hundred boards are 
provided by the John Lewis Partnership in the United Kingdom, VISA International located in the US 
and the nested networks of networked stakeholder cooperatives located around the town of 
Mondragon in Spain.  Their existance indicates that the introduction of network governance need not 
necessarily require any change in the law.  
 
Without the introduction of a division of power within an organisation it is not possible to introduce 
a special type of “ecological” or “holonic” network governance found univerally in social animals 
(Dunbar 1993).  Ecological governance is based on decentralisation as found in the human brain to 
allow redundancy and so resiliency.  As noted by Kurzweil (1999: 84) “None of our individual brain 
cells is all that important – there is no Chief Executive Officer neuron”. 
 
A fundamental requirement of creatures to exist over generations is the ability to sustain their 
existance for sufficient time to reproduce themselves in complex, unknowable dynamic 
environments.  To achieve this objective creatures need to be self-regulating and for their social 
groups to be self-governing.  
 
The ability of firms to become self-regulating would reduce the cost, size and intrusiveness of 
government and their regulators.  For this reason and to follow the imperatives and precendents in 
the evolution of living things, good governance will be defined as the ability of organisations to 
further their self-governance.  To become self-governing, firms need to become self-regulating to 
high degree.  In this way the regulation of firms becomes largley privatised.  Ecological governance 
becomes a part of “networked regulation” (Tomasic & Akinbami 2011: 242).  Offsetting the 
additional costs of introducing self-regulation and self-governance there are operating and 
competitive advantages as identified in section four. Operational efficiency is of little importance for 
a creature or firm that cannot survive. 
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A practical compelling reason for large complex organisations to adopt ecological governance is 
provided by the experience of Japanese robot manufacturers. “The reduction in data transmission, 
and in data complexity, achieved by holonic architecture is prodigeous.  Moreover the advantages 
accumulate as the robotic device gets more complicated.” (Mathews 1996: 30).  In other words 
ecological governance allows the data processing by executives and/or board members to be 
prodigeiously reduced to reduce the risk of physiological and/or neurologcial overloading.  There are 
many additional advantages of ecological governance described in the following sections. 
 
To fully appreciate the advantages of ecological governance an introduction to the science of 
governance is required.  This is undertaken in the following section two. The third section considers 
how and why so called “best” or “good” governance practices have failed. Section four illustrates 
network governance with its benefits for various stakeholders outlined in section five. The concluding 
section six outlines the irrelevancy of dominant corporate governance theories and practices. 
 
2. THE SCIENCE OF GOVERNANCE 
Stafford Beer pioneered the application of cybernetics principles to management that became 
described variously as “operations research”, “management cybernetics”, “management science” or 
“system science”.  As the President of the World Organization of System Science and Cybernetics, 
Beer informed me in 1996 that neither he nor his colleagues had applied the science of control and 
communications to the governance of organizations.   
 
From 1970 to 1973 Beer had worked for President Allende in Chile to establish a system of control 
and communications to operate a socialist economy using Teletype printers.  So while Beer had 
applied the principals of cybernetics to coordinating firms this had been achieved in top down 
control and communication system as commonly found in hierarchical firms.  One widely known 
contribution of Beer (1985) was his concept of organizing units of a firm into a “viable system” to 
efficaciously manage complex tasks.  This contribution was based on conceptual rather than 
quantitative cybernetic analysis. 
 
Quantitative analysis of organizations only became possible when technology progressed to 
allow natural scientists to identify the physiological and neurological limits of individuals to 
receive, store, process and transmit data.  Organizational theorists have long recognized data 
processing as a fundamental problem. Williamson (1979: note 4) stated: “But for the limited 
ability of human agents to receive, store, retrieve, and process data, interesting economic 
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problems vanish”.  “The problem of organization is precisely one of decomposing the 
enterprise in efficient informational processing” (Williamson 1985: 283). 
 
Quantifying the ability of humans to receive, store, process and transmit data was only 
achieved at the turn of the last century.  The then head of the British Telecom Research 
Laboratories Peter Cochrane (2000) quantified the physiological limits of individuals to 
receive and transmit data in terms of bytes as is set in Figure 1.  MIT based voice recognition 
scientist Ray Kurzweil (1999: 103) reported the limitations of the human brain to sequentially 
process data in terms of bytes as noted in the centre of Figure 1.  He explains how humans 
overwhelmingly solve problems by pattern recognition. Kurzweil (1999: 79) points out that 
when ten-year old girl goes to catch a ball “it follows a path that can be predicted from the 
ball’s initial trajectory, spin, and speed, as well as wind conditions.” Calculation of where to 
go to catch the ball “would appear to require the solution of an overwhelming set of complex 
simultaneous equations.”  These equations need to be constantly recomputed as a new visual 
data streams in”.  The point is that humans achieve complex tasks through pattern recognition 
developed through trial and error until the skill becomes innate not requiring conscious data 
processing. Driving a car is an example. Pattern recognition skills provide a rationale for 
business schools to educate through the case method so as to provide synthetic experiences. 
 
The human brain is a massively parallel computer processing many bits of data at once rather 
than one bit at time as undertaken by personal computers at the time Kurzweil was writing in 
1999.  As a result, the personal computer at that time could only “emulate about a million 
neuron connection calculations per second, which is more than a billion times slower than the 
human brain” (Kurzweil 1999: 79).  Like catching a ball, humans recognized faces and voices 
by data pattern recognition.  This is why voice recognition has taken time for computers to 
catch up to the capabilities of the human brain. 
It has now become common for all the data provided to board members to be in digital form.  
This allows the quantity of data received by each board member to be quantified. The time 
involved for its input can also be measured to identify data overload. With the use of content 
analysis estimates of information over load can also be obtained. Technology now makes it 
possible to use data measured in bits and bytes to become a unit of organizational analysis.  
Both Williamson (1990: xi) and Simon (1984: 40) saw the need "for observing the 
phenomena at a higher level of resolution".  Bytes provide an answer in this regard and also 
answer the question raised by Williamson (1990: xi) "how micro is micro?"  





Human input data channelsa Constraints in humans to 
transact bytes created by: Smell Taste Touch Sound Sight 









1 Reception through organs Physiology 
2 Storage through nervous system Physiology 
3 Perception/understanding through the activation and 
strengthening of neural networks which correlate 
current patterns with previous ones 
Physiology plus experience, 
training and motivation 
4 Insight/knowledge through sequential processing in 
neo-cortex limited to around 200 calculations per/sec 
(Kurzweil 1999: 103) 
As above plus size and 
architecture of neo-cortex 
and psychological status 




culture, literacy & numeracy 
Capacity in 
bytes/seca 
Human output data channelsa Data received 10,000 faster 
than the rate at which it can 
be transmitted 
Touch Signs Writing Sound Speech 
<15K <15K <15K <100K <100K 
aSources of channel capacity; Cochrane (1997, 2000; bK= Kilobytes, M=Megabytes  
Figure 1, Human constraints in transacting bytes 
 
A methodology developed by Turnbull (2001b) described as “Transaction Byte Analysis” 
(TBA) provides a way to investigate, design, and compare organizations with either 
hierarchical or network architecture on a quantitative basis.  TBA overcomes the problems 
identified Radner (1992: 1384) who stated: “I know no theoretical research to date that 
compares the relative efficiency of hierarchical and non-hierarchical organizations within a 
common model” and of Demb & Neubauer (1992) who wanted a way to “compare systems of 
corporate governance within and between cultures”. More generally, Demsetz (1991: 159) 
states: "a more complete theory of the firm must give greater weight to information cost than 
is given either in Coase’s theory or in theories based on shirking and opportunism which have 
not gone far enough".  Jensen (1993: 873), an author of agency theory widely used in 
corporate governance analysis observed: "we're facing the problem of developing a viable 
theory of organizations".  While the emergence of network firms led Zingales (2000) to state 
in regards to existing theories of the firm that: “they seem to be quite ineffective in helping us 
cope with the new type of firms that are emerging”. 
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TBA subsumes Transaction Cost Economics (TCE) developed by Williamson (1975; 1985) 
when costs become a proxy for data and its higher order social constructs of information, 
knowledge, and wisdom.  Information represents data that provide meaning to an observer.  
Meaning from non-mathematical languages cannot be quantified.  Nor can knowledge that 
represents information that can be useful for analysis or action.  Likewise wisdom cannot be 
quantified as it represents the knowledge of when to use knowledge.  However, no change in 
the state of information, knowledge or wisdom can occur without the transaction of bytes.   
The sharing of information is dependent on patterns of data being interpreted in a similar 
manner by senders and receivers.  To interpret data in an identical way, the neurological 
circuits of individuals (or creatures) sending data needs to be closely aligned with 
neurological circuits of the individual receiving the data.  However, the neurological 
architecture of even identical twins can vary according to how different external stimuli affect 
their brain development.  “The number of neurons in the human brain is estimated at 
approximately 100 billion, with an average of 1,000 connections per neuron, for a total of 100 
trillion connections” (Kurzweil 1999: 119). Such large numbers means that no two or more 
individuals can be expected to have identical neurological architecture for interpreting an 
identical meaning from a given pattern of data.  However, cultural homogeneity with training 
and conditioning can commonly achieve useful approximations of shared meaning.   
 
Notwithstanding these observations, the word “information” is commonly used ambiguously 
to mean either meaningful data or just data. This ambiguity will be accepted as it is in 
everyday usage to allow quotations that use the word “information” to be accepted without 
qualification.  Examples are Williamson (1985: 283) cited above and for Kurzwiel (1999: 
120) where he states: “The brain relies on a large degree of redundancy and a relative low 
density of information storage to gain reliability and to continue functioning effectively 
despite a high rate of neuron loss as we age”.   
 
2.1 Architecture of nature 
The transaction of bytes involves perturbations in matter and/or energy. Minimizing the transaction 
of bytes is required to minimize the energy and/or matter creatures require to receive, store and 
process data required to sustain their existence as well as to avoid exceeding their physiological and 
neurological limits in transacting bytes.  Minimizing the transaction of bytes in firms would minimize 
costs to allow TBA to subsume TCE. 
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Over billions of years creatures have evolved sustainable systems of self-regulation and governance 
based on survival of the fittest.  Survival provides a basic criterion for achieving self-regulation and 
self-governance.  However, competition for survival means that this needs to be achieved in the 
most economic, efficient and resilient manner. This in turn requires the most efficient and reliable 
system for obtaining signals from the environment, comparing them with past signals, processing the 
data and activating responses to allow creatures to sustain their existence from unknowable complex 
threats and opportunities.  
 
Nature creates complexity and controls complexity by decomposing it into what Simon (1962) 
described as “sub-assemblies” (1962: 472) or “stable intermediate forms” (1962: 473) to create 
“nearly decomposable systems, in which the interactions among the sub-systems are weak, but not 
negligible” (1962: 474). These “sub-assembles”, “forms” and “sub-systems” were described by 
(Koestler 1967) as “holons”.  Koestler describes a hierarchy of holons as a “holarchy” to distinguish it 
from a hierarchy where there is a direct “boss” (Simon 1962: 468) in a command and control system.  
Other terms are used to describe holons like “modules” or “capsules” (Baldwin & Clark 2006), “viable 
systems” (Beer 1985), “chaords” (Hock 1999), “wholes”, “systems”, “org”, “entities” or “cooperative 
heterarchy” noted by Mathews (1996). 
 
An inherent characteristic of holons is that they contain contrary characteristics such as 
centralization/decentralization of control, bottom-up/top-down processes, autonomous/integrated 
behavior and order/ambiguity (Mathews 1996: 52-53).  The ability of organizations to possess 
contrary characteristics was noted by Dee Hock the founding CEO of the credit card company VISA 
international.  To describe the organization he designed with these characteristics he coined the 
word “chaord” by combining the contrary words “chaos” and “order” (Hock 1999). The combination 
of contrary characteristics in physical structures allows new properties to emerge with tensional 
integrity or what Buckminster Fuller (1961) described as “tensegrity”.   
 
Fuller created geodesic domes by combing contrary materials like wire that has strength in tension 
and struts that have strength in compression. The combination of these contrary materials allows the 
greatest area to be covered by a structure with the least weight. The rich variety of stable or dynamic 
configurations that a human body can obtain arise from combining bones that work best in 
compression with muscles that work best in tension. Tensegrity is a fundamental feature of the 
“architecture of life” as described by Ingber (1998) who reports that human cells are constructed 
from material with contrary properties. The reason is because like geodesic domes it provides “a 
maximum amount strength for a given amount of building material” (Ingber 1998: 32).  Tensegrity 
PAGE 8| Journal of Corporate Governance, Insurance, and Risk Management | 2017, VOL. 4, Series. 2 
 
has been adopted by evolution as the most efficient and resilient way to create and sustain living 
things. 
 
DNA programs social creatures, including humans, to possess contrary characteristics like being 
competitive/cooperative, suspicious/trusting, selfish/altruistic and so on.  I described this behavior as 
“Social Tensegrity” (Turnbull 2001b: 84).  Social tensegrity introduces organizational integrity without 
the need for individual integrity advocated by Jensen (2009).  TBA reveals the competitive 
advantages of social tensegrity. It provides creatures with a requisite variety of responses to discover 
those responses that will sustain their life in complex unknowable dynamic environments.  Social 
tensegrity provides “a requisite number of responses to manage uncertainty while using minimum 
energy and/or materials to transact bytes (Turnbull 2001b: 134).  
 
To paraphrase Ingber (1998: 32), it appears that organizations with holonic architecture are able to 
provide “a maximum amount of control (strength) for a given amount of bytes (building material)”.  
In other words social tensegrity in organizations maximizes their ability to self-control/self-
regulate/self-govern with the minimum transaction of bytes.  This in turns explains how network 
governance can provide competitive advantages and resiliency compared with hierarchies that 
create information overload, and lack a requisite variety of communication and control channels to 
control/regulate complexity.  The operating and/or competitive advantage of network organizations 
increases as activities increase in complexity (Craven, Piercy & Shipp, 1996; Jones, Hesterly & 
Borgatti, 1997). 
 
Hierarchies depend upon obedience and conformity. In this way hierarchies inhibit the ability 
of individuals to act in a contrary manner as encouraged by their DNA. This problem was 
identified by Hock (1995: 4) in the last century who stated that: 
Industrial Age, hierarchical command and control pyramids of power, whether 
political, social, educational or commercial, were aberrations of the Industrial 
Age, antithetical to the human spirit, destructive of the biosphere and structurally 
contrary to the whole history and methods of biological evolution. They were not 
only archaic and increasingly irrelevant; there were a public menace. 
 
Hock (1999: 6) observed before the financial crises over the last decade that: 
We are experiencing a global epidemic of institutional failure that knows no bounds. We 
must seriously question the concepts underlying the current structures of organization 
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and whether they are suitable to the management of accelerating societal and 
environmental problems – and, even beyond that, we must seriously consider whether 
they are the primary source of those problems. 
The institutional problem of individuals being inhibited to be contrary is that there is little inbuilt 
ability for hierarchical organizations to generate sufficient variety of responses to manage 
complexity. This problem is overcome with holonic organizations that possess contrary behavior.  
The importance of being able to generate a rich variety of responses to manage complexity arises 
from the cybernetic law of requisite variety that states: “only variety can destroy variety” (Asbhy 
1956: 207). In regards to the law of requisite variety Ashby (1956: 245) explained that: “Its 
importance is that if R[egulator] is fixed in its channel capacity, the law places an absolute limit to the 
amount of regulation (or control) that can be achieved by R[egulator], no matter how R[egulator] is 
re-arrange internally, or how great the opportunity in T [system].” 
 
The variety of responses from any regulator/controller must be sufficient to handle the complexity of 
the variables involved. This is why complex firms cannot be reliably centrally controlled because they 
lack a requisite variety of independently acting controllers.  Likewise, it becomes impossible for 
government regulators to reliably control complex firms on a centralized top-down basis.   
 
The purpose of government regulators is to protect and further the interests of stakeholders and 
society who can be harmed by a firm or put at risk by a firm.  To achieve their objective regulators 
require a requisite variety of controllers.  It is the stakeholders who regulators have been created to 
protect that can provide the requisite variety of control.  This is why stakeholder engagement 
becomes an essential requirement for either firms or their regulators to reliably control complex 
activities as illustrated in Section 4.  It is stakeholders who can expeditiously and sensitively provide 
the bottom-up feedback correction to protect and further their interests and that of society.  
 
These insights explain why so called governance best practices and government regulators cannot 
reliably protect stakeholders.  Efficient, economic and effective control and regulation of complex 
firms requires stakeholders to be constructively engaged in the governance architecture.  This 
explains the necessity for introducing network governance and network regulation when complex 
firms are involved. The engagement of stakeholders into the governance and regulatory architecture 
provide a basis to further the self-regulation and self-governance of firms.  The conditions for 
achieving self-control/regulation/governance are set out in Turnbull (2001b: 118). 
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Adoption of network governance would change the role of government. It would reduce: (a) the 
need for regulators; (b) the size and costs of government while (c) enriching democracy at the grass 
roots level to sustain society and the environment.  The role of government would become indirect, a 
condition required by the law of requisite variety to amplify regulation by supplementation (Ashby 
1956: 270).  In the words of US Vice President Al Gore the role of government would be “to imprint 
the DNA” (Gore 1996) of institutions so they could become self-governing.  
 
DNA in social creatures only survives if it programs its host to possess contrary behavior with 
manifold ying/yang characteristics such as approach/avoidance, etc.  Contrary behavior introduces a 
“requisite variety” (Ashby 1956: 206) of responses that introduces checks and balances to permit the 
selection of the most appropriate reactions in uncertain, dynamic complex life threatening 
environments. While small-brained insects can survive in such environments, the 2008 financial crisis 
revealed that large brained highly intelligent so-called “masters of the universe” could not.  The 
problem is that most large corporations are governed through top down command and control 
hierarchies that resists contrary views, bottom up initiatives or checks and balances.  The inherent 
problems of centralized top-down governance are next considered. 
 
3. FAILURE OF TOP-DOWN ONLY GOVERNANCE  
The failure of current laws, regulations and regulators to protect stakeholders arises because each 
relies on a top down approach.  The evidence of nature and so the science of governance reveals that 
a bottom up approach is also essential to reliably regulate complex organizations operating in 
unknowable, dynamic environments. Lawmakers and their regulators cannot control firms if firm 
directors and/or executives in turn rely only on a top down control system without independent 
feedback signals from everywhere else.  
 
Network governance introduces bottom up control and communications from the very people 
governments and regulators are trying to protect. As illustrated by the John Lewis Partnership, the 
Mondragón Corporacion Cooperativa (MCC) and by Figure 4, it is plain common sense for 
stakeholders to be included in the governance architecture of firms.  Michael Porter (1992) 
recommended this approach in his report to the US government on competiveness. But his ideas 
were not adopted because stakeholders on a US unitary board would introduce conflicts of interest.   
 
What Porter did not take into account is that bottom up feedback communication in Japanese and 
German firms are channeled through a different board. Such boards not only obtain, (i) the 
information to act but also; (ii) the incentive; (iii) power and (iv), capability to act.  These four 
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conditions are not typically present in US/UK type of disconnected capitalism as shown by Turnbull & 
Pirson (2012). It is by making such connections that network governance can reduce risks and 
provide competitive advantages. 
 
Network governance also separates conflicts of interest and introduces different viewpoints to 
create checks and balances to establish more mutually effective and resilient operations. In addition, 
by separating the governance and management powers of directors, governance and management 
functions can then paradoxically be integrated throughout the firm.  How this is achieved in practice 
by the Mondragón stakeholder controlled cooperatives is illustrated in Figure 7.3 in Turnbull (2001b: 
245). Kay (1996) and Givens (1991) describe how stakeholder engagements can be added to 
traditional hierarchical firms. 
 
The integration of management and governance in turn introduces self-regulation and self-
governance as found in nature.  Network governance provides a way to overcome the built in 
problems with current ideas of “best” practices for a unitary board to provide systemic solutions as 
indicated in Table 1.  Details of “The corrupting powers of a unitary board” are presented in Turnbull 
(2001b: 115). 
 
Network governance empowers Governors who take of the roles of NEDs, with information 
independently of management to monitor management. Without network governance, common 
sense suggests that the more a director is considered to be independent then the more the director 
lacks authority and knowledge to monitor and evaluate management and the business operations. 
This explains why there is no compelling empirical evidence that NEDs can improve performance or 
prevent disasters. On the contrary, Bhaghat & Black (2002) found evidence that increasing the 
number of NEDs on a board reduces performance. 
 
The proliferation of governance codes arise because corporate lobbyists argue that to remain 
competitive firms need governments to adopt a “light touch” to allow self-regulation.  But belief in 
self-regulation is irresponsible and dangerous with firms governed by a unitary board that allows 
directors absolute power to identify and manage their conflicts of interest (Jackson 2007).  Self-
regulation only becomes possible firstly if a division of powers is created and secondly if stakeholders 
become empowered to assists in protecting themselves.  As noted above stakeholder engagement 
also provides a way to increase competitiveness. So self-regulation and competitiveness can be 
achieved together.  In addition network governance provides a way to make firms directly 
accountable to stakeholders for their social and environmental concerns. 
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Table 1 How ecological governance overcomes problems of a unitary board 
Systemic problems for unitary board 
Non-Executive Directors (NEDs): 
Systemic solutions from introducing network governance used 
by nature described as “ecological governance”: 
1 Suspicion by outsiders that the 
absolute power of directors to 
identify and manage their own 
conflicts of interest might corrupt 
the directors and/or the business. 
Corporate charter establishes a governance board and a 
management board of directors elected by cumulative voting 
with one vote per share and Governors with one vote per 
shareholder.  Governors control auditors, director nomination 
and pay with veto powers when conflicts exist for directors 
(Dallas 1977). 
2 No creditable systematic process 
for NEDs to determine when their 
trust in management might be 
misplaced.   
Corporate charters makes provision for any class of stakeholders 
to elect a representative board to meet with governors 
independently of management or directors to provide feedback 
and/or feed forward competitive intelligence to them and/or 
mgrs. 
3 Exposure of NEDs to personal 
liabilities and loss of reputation 
from management misdeeds. 
Misdeeds of executives are the responsibility of the directors’ as 
Governors do not have power to manage business operations. As 
indicated in Figures 3 & 4 directors could include non-executives. 
4 No systemic access for NEDs to 
information opposing 
management views and so for 
evaluating management 
independently of managers. 
Feedback from establishment of one or more “Employee 
Assemblies”, “Creditors Councils” and “Debtors Forums” who 
may appoint a “Stakeholder Congress” to advise on KPIs used to 
determine executive appointments and their remuneration. 
5 No diversity of information 
sources to cross check integrity of 
management information or 
obtain second or more opinions. 
Diversified feedback provided from specialized stakeholders 
groups and their Boards with informal access to Government 
regulator who chairs their Stakeholder Congress. Congress chairs 
AGM determining pay and election of Directors and Governors. 
6 Coping with data and information 
overload. 
Compliance information and liabilities transferred to directors 
with option of strategic analysis transferred to a supervisory 
board as found in Europe. 
7 Difficulties in detecting biases, 
errors and omissions in reports 
from managers. 
Access to a requisite variety of independent crosschecking 
sources of stakeholder feedback to obtain accuracy as much as 
desired as demonstrated by Shannon (1948). 
8 Inadequate knowledge for 
complex decision-making. 
Simplification of decision making by decentralization into to a 
requisite variety of centers as described by Von Neumann 
(1947). 
9 Board decision-making subject 
biases in its membership – 
Exposed to multiple diverse and contrary viewpoints raised by 
stakeholders to force consideration of taboo topics and avoid 
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Gender biases, etc. culture of don’t ask don’t tell. 
10 Lack of will to act against 
management. 
Governors not captive to management information and/or 
executive powers and influence with independent power and/or 
influence on director nomination, pay and tenure. 
11 Lack of a systemic way to safely 
blow the whistle on errors, 
misdeeds, etc. 
Provided privately by network of boards connected to the 
government regulator and/or firm specific employee 
ombudsperson. 
12 Impossibility of directly 
controlling/countering complex 
variables/risks. 
Control amplified indirectly through requisite variety of 
stakeholders acting as co-regulators (Ashby 1956: 265). 
 
The fact that direct amplification of reliable control or regulation is impossible has profound and 
widespread implications for the structure of complex organizations in the public, private and/or non-
profit sectors. It means that all complex organizations need to include stakeholders as co-regulators 
to supplement the variety of control to improve their regulation.  It also reveals the futility of top 
down proposals to improve corporate governance and business regulation.  Some legal scholars have 
recognized the need for a division of board powers (Braithwaite 1997, Dallas 1997) and the need for 
“networked regulation” (Tomasic & Akinbami 2011) as is next considered. 
 
4. NETWORK GOVERNANCE 
Network governance can be introduced by changing corporate constitutions (Turnbull 2000a).  A 
basic requirement is the introduction of a division of powers.  This allows checks and balances to 
exist as found in nature, our bodies and in our brains.  My PhD research revealed how the 
architecture of the MCC and the constitutions of its member firms exemplify “the architecture of life” 
(Ingber 1998).  An architecture that is ubiquitous throughout the universe (Turnbull 2001b: 130, 221).   
 
However, before reaching my PhD research epiphany, it seemed like just plain common sense to 
introduce elements of network governance into the constitutions of start-up-firms that I founded.  I 
had two motives: (1) to raise millions of dollars at the lowest cost, and (2) protect my reputation as a 
serial entrepreneur in the event the business did not exceed. Both objectives were achieved 
(Turnbull 2000a, 2002c). 
 
I introduced three basic changes.  First, removing the absolute power of directors to identify and 
manage their own conflicts of interests to avoid the possibility of corrupting themselves and/or the 
business.  Second, removing unethical conflicts of interest that arise for: (a) directors when they 
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appoint and pay the auditor who judges them, and (b) auditors when they are selected and paid by 
the directors whose accounts they judge as shown in Figure 2.   
 
Judges in a law court cannot claim to be independent when they are selected and paid by the people 
they are judging. If the judge then attested that he/she was “independent”, as auditors do, then it 
would be the judge that would be sent to jail.  The third change was to remove the power of any 
director to chair a meeting of shareholders where shareholders were holding directors to account, 
determining their pay and/or their appointment.  Instead, the chairman of a shareholders’ audit 
committee described as a “Governance Board” chaired the AGM.  Refer to Figure 3.  
 
The separation of powers that I introduced were similar to those typically introduced by venture 
capitalists and bankers for providing finance.  These first steps in introducing network governance do 
not represent a radical precedent nor would they inhibit the ability of businesses to add value and 
grow.  Network governance protects the reputations of directors by removing suspicion and 
questions from stakeholders and the media that directors could be feathering their own nests rather 
than creating nest eggs for others.  Refer to row 1, Table 1 
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Fig. 2 Unethical conflicts of unitary board 
In a law court it is unethical for a Judge to be paid and controlled by those being 
judged. 
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5.  UNDERSTANDING THE ADVANTAGES OF NETWORK GOVERNANCE  
Company directors, scholars and governance experts typically reject the idea of network governance 
when they note the complexity of networked governed firms such as presented in Turnbull (2001b: 
207).  While it may be counter intuitive, the tasks of individuals can be simplified by greater 
organization complexity as illustrated by the MCC (Turnbull 2001b: 245). Simplification in hierarchies 
is achieved through limiting the span of control and by introducing multidivisional forms of 
organizations (Williamson 1975: 32).  
The eye glazing, mind-numbing complexity of the MCC control and communication architecture 
presented in Turnbull (2001b: 207) represents what is described as “state description” (Simon, 1962; 
479; De Vany, 1998).  Like the complexity of nature it can be explicated simply from a “process 
description” that describes how complexity is constructed from simpler components as presented in 
Turnbull (2001b: 221)1.  As noted by Simon (1962: 479) “The problem of finding relatively simple 
descriptions for complex systems is of interest not only for an understanding of human knowledge of 
the world but also for an explanation of how a complex system can reproduce itself.”   
 
Centralized governance through hierarchies are now well past their “use by date” for large complex 
financial institutions.  Pirson & Turnbull (2011) explain how firms judged too big to fail are likely also 
to be too big to be reliably managed, governed or regulated without network governance.  In our 
follow up article we raise the question “Could the 2008 US financial crisis have been avoided with 
network governance?” (Turnbull & Pirson, 2012). 
 
Some of the benefits of network governance for NEDs who become “Governors” are next 
considered. The advantages for auditors, managers, investors, stakeholder and regulators are also 
outlined in the following subsections. 
 
5.1  Governors 
Nine of the benefits for NEDs being elected separately by shareholders to become Governors are 
outlined below: 
1) Role simplified and information overload reduced by the decomposition of decision-making 
labor that also minimizes compliance responsibilities and so personal liabilities (Clarke 2006; 
Page 2009; Rodriques 2007; Turnbull 2001b: 245). 
                                                             
1 The complexity of the MCC is parsimoniously summed up in the four columns and five rows of “Table 6.1, Holon typology of 
Mondragón” on page 221 of Turnbull (2001b).  Table 6.1 allow the complexity of the MCC to be revealed as a consistent continuum 
of how the complexity of life is created and the universe emerges as shown in “Table 3.8, Holarchy: Hierarchy of Holons” on page 
130.  Table 6.1 also illustrates the point made by Simon (1962: 479): “the task of science is to make use of the world's redundancy 
to describe that world simply.” 
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2) Monitoring and supervisory roles legitimatized by obtaining access rich variety information 
to evaluate management and the business independently of management (Shannon 1948). 
3) Ability to cross check management reports for errors, biases, distortions, omissions and 
“spin” from additional independent communication channels from a diversity of stakeholders 
(Shannon 1948, Turnbull 2001b: 99). 
4) Formal and informal access to industry, product and competitive intelligence and/or whistle 
blowers from systematized stakeholder engagement (Porter 1992; Turnbull 1997; 2000b, 
2001a). 
5) Creditable processes established on an independent systemic basis for learning when trust in 
management might be misplaced (Page 2009). 
6) Exposure to most financial liabilities transferred to full time executives as NED not 
responsible for management decisions. 
7) Unethical conflicts with financial auditor eliminated with exclusive control of internal auditor 
(Turnbull 2002c, 2008a, 2009). 
8) Residual personal conflicts on NEDs own pay and tenure taken over or mediated by 
stakeholder congress. 
9) Intelligence on Key Performance Indicators (KPIs) for executives provided by stakeholders 
exposed to services, costs and/or risks from management (Turnbull, 2002b, 2009). 
10)  
5.2 Auditors 
External auditors obtain substantial benefits from enhancing their integrity, professionalism and role 
in four ways. 
1) Unethical conflicts removed by Auditor no longer selected, appointed and remunerated 
directors whose accounts they are judging (Gitins 2002; Hatherly 1995; Haywood 2003; 
O’Connor 2004; Shapiro, 2004; Turnbull 2008a). 
2) Unconscious bias in judging accounts is removed as identified by Bazerman, Loewenstein & 
Moore (2002).  
3) The possibility of the auditor not being seen as being independent of the officers whose 
accounts they are judging is removed to remove the need for audit partner or audit firm 
rotation (Bazerman, Morgan & Lowenstein1997, Shapiro 2004, and Haywood 2003). 
4) Access is obtained to a rich variety of alternative communication channels to cross check the 
integrity of corporate data independently of management (Shannon 1948).  
5)  
5.3 Management 
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Management obtains formal systemic processes for accessing stakeholder resources for enhancing 
operations. 
1) Formal relationships established to facilitate and/or arbitrate Total Quality Management 
(TQM) and Just in time (JIT) processes with relevant stakeholders (Turnbull 1997; 2000a,b; 
2001a). 
2) Process for accessing innovational, operational and competitive intelligence from 
stakeholders that might not otherwise be provided on a systematic basis (Hippel 1986). 
3) Facilitate stakeholder loyalty and engagement to constructively support the firm (Givens 
1991). 
4) Systematic process to quickly learn about problems and take corrective actions before 
governors/regulators. 
5) Harness pro-bono stakeholder resources for continuous improvements (Givens 1991; 
Turnbull 1997; 2000a,b; 2001a). 
6) Compliance processes integrated into management. 
7)  
5.4 Stakeholders  
Those parties who are affected by the firm and described as stakeholders obtain formal direct and 
contingently influential relationships to protect and further their interests as outlined below and 
discussed in greater details by Givens (1991), Kay (1996), and Turnbull (1997, 2000a,b, 2001a). 
1) Formal access to contribute continuous improvement programs for mutual benefits. 
2) Direct access to correct poor quality goods/services and relationships. 
3) Direct, quicker and more responsive access to protect and further their own interest than 
regulators, courts and/or public protests.  
4) Strengthen constructive working relationships and mediate others. 
5)  
5.5  Regulators 
The role of regulators is enhanced while their size and cost can be reduced in four ways as outlined 
below: 
1) Amplification of regulation through stakeholder supplementation as co-regulators (Ashby 
1956: 265); 
2) Higher integrity of monitoring communications through multiple stakeholder feedback 
(Shannon 1948); 
3) Improved formal and informal access to monitor firms and the integrity of the self-regulating 
processes of firms (Turnbull 2001b: 118);  
4) Role changes to promoting and supervising the integrity of firm self-governance (Gore 1996). 
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6. CLOSING REMARKS  
Even without applying the insights of cybernetics this paper reveals that the current dominant form 
of US/UK governance architecture and practices are not supported by common sense, ethics, theory 
or compelling empirical evidence. The new types of nonhierarchical firms that concerned Zingales 
(2000) include those with network governance. These diminish the relevancy of agency theory 
(Jensen & Meckling 1976) and stewardship theory (Davis, Schoorman and Donaldson 1997) 
commonly used by governance scholars.  The diminishing arises because the role of agents and 
stewards can become irrelevant and/or interchanged in a network at different times.  
 
The impotency and/or irrelevancy of governance laws, regulations, regulators and codes is 
demonstrated by the many recent high profile and unexpected failures.  For example there are 
manifold and continually changing definitions of director “independence” and confusion over the 
purpose of seeking independence (Clarke 2006; Page 2009).  Rodrigues (2007) has noted the 
“fetishization of Independence” not withstanding that extensive empirical survey by Bhagat & Black 
(2002) that found no correlation of director independence and performance with US boards. The 
evidence suggested that firm performance decreases as the independent directors on a board are 
increased.  This supports the common sense observation considered earlier.  
 
Likewise there has been a long historical confusion over the different legal purposes of external 
auditing in the UK and the US that has led to confusion about the role and structure of audit of 
committees (Turnbull 2008a).  There is denial by practitioners in recognizing the unethical 
relationship between auditors and directors as raised by a number of scholars such as: Bazerman, 
Morgan & Lowenstein (1997); Bazerman, Loewenstein & Moore (2002); Haywood (2003); O’Connor 
(2004); Shapiro (2004); Romano (2004).  Hatherly (1995) proposed that a shareholder committee 
should control the auditor as indicated in Figures 3 and 4 as is the practice in some European 
countries like France (Analytica 1992: 107), Hungary (Lempert 2003), Italy (Melis 2004) and Russia 
(Gitins 2002). 
 
Regulators seem to be captive to practitioners and so limit their consideration of changes to mainly 
those that are only cosmetic in nature.  They then falsely claim that such changes increase audit 
independence when the inherent unethical conflicts of interest still remain.  Changes like limiting 
non-audit services, rotating partners and/or rotating auditors do not remove the unethical 
relationships.  The ability of auditors to legally attest that they are “independent” illustrates how this 
word has become perverted from its widely accepted meaning.  It is not a good look for directors and 
auditors to be seen by the public as not being able to recognize unethical and/or untrue relationship 
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by stating that in some obscure technical and largely irrelevant basis they can classify themselves as 
being “independent”. 
 
Likewise, fundamental changes in the concentration of corporate power and influence are little 
considered in new reforms (Sharpe 2010).  It is time to fundamentally rethink the roles of directors, 
governance and regulators.  The very fact that codes of behavior are required proves the inadequacy 
and/or irrelevancy of corporate laws, regulations and regulators. In the natural world, the control 
and communication system in creatures is programmed to sustain their existence on a resilient self-
regulating basis without codes.  Unless there is fundamental rethinking the endless revisions of laws, 
regulations and codes will continue to meet the political and social imperatives of being seen to 
being doing something to reduce unexpected failures.  Governance science reveals that fundamental 
change is required to adopt the control and communication architecture found in nature. 
 
Re-designing the architecture of corporate governance could be introduced on an incremental basis.  
In Australia I negotiated with the regulator to avoid the cost of calling an AGM to change the auditor.  
The exemption was granted because the regulator accepted that the democratically elected 
shareholder audit committee protected minority shareholders better than shareholders voting on 
the usual plutocratic basis of one vote per shareholder.  By such processes corporations could 
negotiate incremental de-regulation. The UK Financial Reporting Council supported this approach by 
sponsoring the presentation of my paper on the ‘The Theory and Practice of Government De-
regulation’ to a conference2 for regulators (Turnbull 2008c).  
 
As documented in this paper there is growing concern by legal and other scholars over the role of 
directors, governance and regulation in English speaking countries (Howson 2009, Sharpe 2010, Sun, 
Steward & Pollard 2011, Vasudev & Watson 2012). These and other scholars provide evidence of 
various so-called “best practices” being unethical, conflicted, counterproductive, naïve and 
dangerous for directors, shareholders and regulators. 
 
There is also growing acceptance by other leading scholars of the contrary views outlined in this 
paper.  These include my PhD examiners, editors who have solicited my contrary views in their 
reference books and textbooks and the many referees involved in publishing Turnbull (1995; 
2000a,b; 2002a,b; 2008a,b,c; 2009; 2010; 2011; 2012).  These writings provide additional details of 
the science and practices self-regulation and self-governance. 
                                                             
2 2nd Cambridge University Conference on ‘Regulation, Inspection & Improvement, Judge Business School Centre for Business 
Research, 12 September 2007. 
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The contribution of this paper is to present both a practical and a theoretical overview for rethinking 
director’s roles, governance and regulation.  The theoretical framework provided by governance 
science identifies the impossibility of direct reliable control, regulation and/or governance of large 
complex firms with a unitary control structure by the firm or its regulator.  This means that regulators 
are being irresponsible to allow large complex firms to exist without network governance (Jackson 
2007; Pirson & Turnbull 2011; Turnbull & Pirson 2012).   
 
As shown in section five, network governance provides numerous practical advantages for directors, 
auditors, management, stakeholders and regulators. The conclusion that network governance should 
be required for large complex firms is supported by both practical and theoretical considerations.  
The constructive engagement of stakeholders through network governance introduces direct 
democratic process for improving the social and environmental behavior of firms in way to reduce 
the size, intrusiveness and cost of government.  It is in these ways and for these reasons that a 
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